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1. Introduction 
The most widely used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is defined equal to 
twice the area between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference1. The simple and direct relationship 
between the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve appears to be the major reason for its popularity in 
applied work. However, since empirical analyses of income inequality normally deals with issues that 
require use of decomposition methods numerous proposals on how to decompose the Gini coefficient 
by income sources as well as by subgroups has occurred in the literature2. The purpose of subgroup 
decomposition is to study the relationship between overall inequality and inequality within and 
between population subgroups defined by variables like gender, age, education and region of 
residence3. As opposed to the inequality measures that are additively decomposable, the so-called 
generalized entropy family of inequality measures, the Gini coefficient does not admit decomposition 
into within- and between-group components. However, by adding an extra term that captures the 
overlap between the marginal income distributions of subgroups it can be demonstrated that the Gini 
coefficient can be decomposed into three terms, the within-group term, the between-group term and an 
interaction term4. Note that the interaction term vanishes when there is no overlapping of income ranks 
between income units belonging to different subgroups; i.e. when the income distributions of 
subgroups do not overlap. However, a number of alternative approaches for decomposing the Gini 
coefficient and other measures of inequality by subgroups could be defined, see Shorrocks (1984). The 
purpose of this paper is to introduce a new method that can be considered to be a parallel to Lerman 
and Yitzhaki’s (1985) elasticity approach for decomposing the Gini coefficient by income sources, 
which means that the elasticity of the Gini coefficient with respect to various income components is 
treated as the basic quantities of the decomposition method. Thus, we turn the focus from 
decomposing the Gini coefficient or any other inequality measure into a within-inequality term, a 
between-inequality term and eventually an interaction (overlapping) term to the effects of marginal 
changes in the variables that are used to specify the population subgroups. 
                                                     
1 See Giorgi (1990) for a bibliographical portrait of the Gini coefficient.  
2 See e.g. Rao (1969), Kakwani (1977, 1980), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Chakravarty (1990) and  Silber (1993) for useful 
discussions on decomposing the Gini coefficient by income sources.  
3 See e.g Shorrocks (1984).  
4 More on the derivation and interpretation of the subgroup decomposition of the Gini coefficient, see Bhatacharya and 
Mahalanonis (1967), Piesch (1975), Silber (1989), Yitzhaki (1994), Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991), Lambert and Aronson 
(1993) and Dagum (1997). 
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2. Decomposition of Lorenz curves and rank-dependent measures 
of inequality  
Let Y be a positive, continuous random variable representing wage or income, X a random covariate 
vector. Leaving out the influence of X, the overall Lorenz curve is 
 [ ]
1
1 1
0 0
1 1L(u) I t u F (t)dt I y F (u) yd F(y)
∞
− −⎡ ⎤= ≤ = ≤⎣ ⎦µ µ∫ ∫  
where 
0
yd F(y)
∞
µ = ∫  is the mean of Y, F-1 denotes the left inverse of the distribution function F of Y, 
and I is the indicator function. L(u) gives the proportion of the total amount of income that is owned 
by the 100 u poorest percent of the population. We extend this definition to include the influence of 
covariates by considering the proportion of the total amount of income that is owned by the 
subpopulation with covariate values x and with income below the u’th quantile in the entire 
population. To this end we define the pseudo-Lorenz regression curve as 
(2.1) 
( ) { } ( )
( )
1 1
0
1
1 1
0
1 1u E Y I Y F (u) y I y F (u) d F y
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− −
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∫
∫ ∫
x X x x
x
  
where F(y )x  denotes the distribution function of Y given X=x. Although this curve differs from the 
standard Lorenz curve it has the nice property that it is a decomposition of the Lorenz curve in the 
sense that its expected value equals the Lorenz curve for the total population, i.e. by using the iterated 
expectation theorem, see Bickel and Doksum (2001), we find 
(2.2) ( )E u L(u)⎡ ⎤Λ =⎣ ⎦X .  
As (2.1) shows, this definition of Lorenz regression aggregates incomes from the subgroup with 
covariate vector x, but uses F-1(u) as a common reference when computing proportions5. This reference 
quantile F-1(u) is the u’th quantile of the overall income distribution F(y) which is obtained by 
averaging out x, that is, ( )F(y) E F y⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦X . If X is used to partition the sample space into distinct 
categories 1 sC ,...,C  with probabilities ( ) ( )j jP C P C , j 1,...,s= ∈ =X , then (2.2) becomes 
                                                     
5 See Aaberge, Bjerve and Doksum (2005) who have used conditional Lorenz curves for deriving a regression framework for 
the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient. 
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 ( ) ( )s j j
j 1
L(u) P C u C
=
= Λ∑  
where 
(2.3) ( ) { } j1 1j j j j(C )1u C E Y I Y F (u) C L(F (F (u)) C )− −µ⎡ ⎤Λ = ≤ ∈ =⎣ ⎦µ µx ,  
and jL( C )⋅ is the Lorenz curve for sub-population Cj. Note that ( ) ( )j jP C 1 C 1Λ =∑ , but 
( ) jj (C )1 C 1µΛ = ≠µ  except when j(C )µ = µ . Thus, the above decomposition of the Lorenz curve 
gives a method for identifying the contribution to overall inequality from each subgroup, where the 
subgroup contributions can be expressed as the product of three components; the proportion of the 
population that belong to the subgroup, the ratio between the subgroup mean income and the overall 
mean income and an interaction component that depends on income inequality within the subgroup as 
well as the relative location of the subgroup distribution.  
 Similar to (2.3) for the discrete case we get the following expression for the continuous 
case, 
(2.4) ( ) ( )( )u L g(u)µΛ = µ
xx x   
where ( )1g(u) F F (u)−= x  and L( )⋅ x  is the (conditional) Lorenz curve for F(y )x .  
 To summarize the information provided by the pseudo Lorenz curve ( )uΛ x  we may use 
the pseudo-Gini coefficient6 defined by  
(2.5) ( ) [ ]{ }1
0
1( ) 2 u u du E Y 2F(Y) 1⎡ ⎤Γ = − Λ = −⎣ ⎦ µ∫x x x ,  
or alternatively any member of the following family of pseudo inequality measures  
(2.6) [ ]{ }1P
0
( ) 1 P (u) ( )du E Y 1 P (F(Y))′′ ′Ψ = + Λ = −∫x x x ,  
                                                     
6 Kakwani (1980) introduced a similar definition in cases where x is a vector of discrete variable. See also   Mahalanobis 
(1960). 
6 
where the weight-function P′  is the derivative of a concave function P defined on the unit interval that 
satisfies the conditions P(0) 0= , P(1) 1= and P (1) 0′ = . Note that the unconditional counterpart of 
(2.6) is the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality introduced by Mehran (1976)7. By 
inserting for 2P(u) 2u u= −  in (2.5) we find that P ( ) ( )Ψ = Γx x . As for the pseudo-Lorenz curve we 
find the following convenient aggregation property for the pseudo inequality measures P ( )Ψ x  
(2.7) [ ] [ ]
1 1
1
P P
0 0
1J E ( ) EY 1 P (F(Y)) 1 P (u)dL(u) 1 P (u)F (u)du−′ ′ ′= Ψ = − = − = −
µ∫ ∫X .  
As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000) the Gini coefficient attaches an equal weight to a given transfer of 
income irrespective of where it takes place in the income distribution, as long as the income transfer 
occurs between individuals with the same difference in ranks. Thus, in general the Gini coefficient 
favors neither the lower nor the upper part of the Lorenz curve. To supplement the information 
provided by the Gini coefficient it might be relevant to use the Bonferroni coefficient8 defined by 
(2.8) ( ) [ ]
1
1
0
1B 1 u L u du 1 E Ylog F(Y)−⎡ ⎤= − = +⎣ ⎦ µ∫   
and the pseudo-Bonforroni coefficient defined by  
(2.9) ( ) [ ]{ }1 1
0
1( ) 1 u u du 1 E Ylog F(Y)−⎡ ⎤Β = − Λ = +⎣ ⎦ µ∫x x x   
Note that B and Б(x) corresponds to JP and ΨP for ( )P(u) u 1 log u= − . As demonstrated by Aaberge 
(2000) the Bonferroni coefficient B satisfies Mehran's principle of positional transfer sensitivity9 for 
any distribution function F and Kolm's principle of diminishing transfers for all F for which logF(x) is 
strictly concave. Thus, B is particular sensitive to transfers that occur in the lower part of the income 
distribution for logconcave distribution functions. 
 As suggested in Section 1 the main purpose of this paper is not to focus attention on the 
various components defined by the covariable vector x in cases where x is a vector of discrete 
variables, but to treat x as a vector of continuous variables and develop a framework that can be 
                                                     
7 Mehran (1976) introduced the JP-family by relying on descriptive arguments, whereas alternative normative motivations of 
the JP-family and various subfamilies of the JP-family have been provided by Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), 
Weymark (1981), Yaari (1987,1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) and Aaberge (2001). 
8 For a discussion of the Bonferroni coefficient see D'Addario (1936), Nygård and Sandström (1981), Aaberge (1982, 2000) 
and Giorgi (1998).  A poverty measure derived from the Bonferroni coefficient has been introduced by Giorgi (2001). 
9 See also Nygård and Sandstrøm (1981) and Giorgi (1998). 
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considered to provide similar information as the decomposition method in a situation with discrete 
variables. To this end we introduce the regression coefficients of the regression functions (2.1), (2.5) 
and (2.6) as quantities that provide information on the influence of covariates on overall inequality. 
3.  Measuring the effect of covariates on rank-dependent 
measures of inequality 
By exploiting the parallel with the quantile regression approach, Aaberge, Bjerve and Doksum (2005) 
developed a regression framework for the conditional Lorenz curve, the conditional Gini coefficient 
and conditional rank-dependent measures of inequality, which can be used to examine the influence of 
covariates x on income inequality in the conditional distribution ( F(y )x ) of Y given given =X x . 
However, sine the overall Lorenz curve and the overall Gini coefficient will not be attained by 
averaging out the covariates in the conditional Lorenz curve and the conditional Gini coefficient, the 
effects of covariates on the conditional Lorenz curve and the conditional Gini coefficient do not 
immediately carry over to the overall Lorenz curve and the overall Gini coefficient. Thus, the 
(conditional) Lorenz and Gini regression coefficients are not the appropriate quantities when focus is 
turned to the effects of covariates on overall inequality. To this end it appears more relevant to 
consider the regression coefficients of the pseudo-Lorenz curve and the pseudo-Gini coefficient 
introduced in Section 2. The pseudo-Lorenz regression coefficient curves are defined by  
(3.1) j
j
(u )
(u; ) , 0 u 1, j 1,2,...,s,
x
∂Λλ = ≤ ≤ =
∂
x
x   
and can be considered as measures of the relative importance of the covariate xj on income 
inequality10. They show how much a small perturbation of xj for j=1, 2, …s changes the pseudo-
Lorenz curves and allows the effects of the covariates to depend on whether the response is located in 
the lower, the central or the upper segment of the income distribution. Similarly as for the quantile 
regression coefficients curves it may be useful to summarize the pseudo-Lorenz regression coefficient 
curves across the covariates by 
(3.2) ( )j j(u) E u; , 0 u 1, j 1,2,...,s.λ = λ ≤ ≤ =X   
                                                     
10 A similar approach for quantile regression was introduced by Chaudhury et al. (1997). 
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Note that j (u)λ  gives the average change of the pseudo-Lorenz curves due to small change in the j’th 
covariate when the remaining covariates are first kept fixed, then averaged out. We call j ( )λ ⋅ the j’th 
marginal pseudo-Lorenz curve. 
 To complete the summarization of the pseudo-Lorenz regression coefficients provided by 
j (u)λ a summary measure that captures the variation across quantiles will be introduced. To this end 
we may use the pseudo-Gini coefficient as a summary measure of the information content of the 
pseudo-Lorenz curve. The pseudo-Gini regression coefficients that correspond to (3.1) are defined by 
(3.3) 
1
j j
j 0
( )( ) 2 (u, )du , j 1,2,...,s.
x
∂Γγ = = − λ =
∂ ∫xx x   
Moreover, by summarizing over x we get 
(3.4) 
1
j j j
0
E ( ) 2 (u)du , j 1,2,...,s.γ = γ = − λ =∫X   
The corresponding pseudo-Bonferroni summary measures are given by 
(3.5) j j j
j
B( )b ( ) , b E b ( )
x
∂
= =
∂
xx X .  
Since alternative methods for summarizing the pseudo-Lorenz regression coefficients may be called 
for, we introduce the ΨP-regression coefficients derived from the pseudo-inequality measures defined 
by (2.5), 
(3.6) ( )
1
P
jP j
j 0
( )( ) P (u) u, du, j 1,2,...,s
x
∂Ψ
′′ξ = = λ =
∂ ∫xx x ,  
where P′′  is the second derivative of the weight-function P. By summarizing over x we get 
(3.7) 
1
jP iP j
0
E ( ) P (u) (u)du, j 1,2,...,s′′ξ = ξ = λ =∫X .  
Note that 2P(u) 2u u= −  is the P-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient, whilst 
( )P(u) u 1 log u= −  corresponds to the Bonferroni coefficient ( )P (u) 1 u′′ = − . 
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4. Estimation 
We have considered a variety of maps sm : R R→  that measure inequality in income Y as a function 
of covariates sR∈x . These surfaces m(⋅), which are referred to as “curves” in the literature and this 
paper, can not be displayed effectively, nor estimated efficiently unless the sample sizes are enormous. 
For this reason we turn to summary measures: The average derivative nonparametric parameter is the 
gradient vector 
(4.1) 
T
j
m( ) m( ) , j 1,...,s
x
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂∇ = =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
x x   
In the case of single index models, m( )∇ x  is proportional to the single index parameter vector. 
 Average Derivative Estimates (ADE’s) have been proposed and analysed by Stoker 
(1986), Härdle and Stoker (1989), Härdle et al. (1993), Chaudhury et al. (1997), and Hristache et al. 
(2001), among others. Related work on projection pursuit regression appears in Friedman and Stuetzle 
(1981) and Hall (1989). One basic idea is to estimate the gradient m∇  locally near a sample point xi 
by using locally weighted least squares. That is, use ˆ m∇ , where 
(4.2) 
( )
  ( ) ( ){ }s
n 2i j iT
j j i 2Ra R, j 1i
12 2T
n n
ij ij
j2 2
ij ij ijj 1 j 1
mˆ
arg min V a K
hm
1 1 1
K V K .
h h
∈∈
=
−
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟= − + β −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∇⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
= ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∑
∑ ∑
X X X
X X
X
X X
X X X
β
  
Here h is a tuning parameter selected using the data, ij j i ,= − ⋅X X X , is Euclidean distance, and the 
basic data ( ) ( ){ }1 1 n n,V ,..., ,VX X  is assumed to be i.i.d. The proceeding references give various 
modifications of this basic formula in order to deal with regions with sparse data. 
 To use these methods we need further specification. We have considered the following 
three m’s: 
(4.3) 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
1
1
1
2
1
3
m u; u E Y I F(Y) u ,
m ( ) ( ) 1 2 E Y E Y F(Y) ,
m ( ) ( ) 1 E Ylog F(Y) .
−
−
−
⎡ ⎤= Λ = µ ≤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= Γ = − µ −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= Β = + µ ⎣ ⎦
x x x
x x x x
x x x
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Thus, we need ADE’s for the four cases where [ ]V Y I F(Y) u= ≤ , V Y= , V Y F(Y)=  and 
V Ylog F(Y)= . 
 Because F is unknown, we need to replace ( )iF Y  by its empirical version ( )iFˆ Y i n= , 
where the incomes { }iY  have been arranged in increasing order and Xi now denotes the covariate 
vector that belongs with the i’th ordered Y. For ease of interpretation and display the ADE algorithms 
require that each Xij in the sample have the sample mean jX  subtracted and be divided by the sample 
standard deviation js , j 1,...,s= . Our curves require an estimate of E(Y)µ = , which we take as ˆ Yµ = . 
 We label the outputs from the ADE algorithms as 
  ( )kj im , k 1,2,3, j 1,...,s, i 1,...,n∇ = = =X . Then our estimates are 
   ( )n1 1jj i
i 1
ˆ (u) n m u;−
=
λ = ∇∑ X  (Lorenz curve in direction Xj) 
(4.4)   ( )n1 2 jj i
i 1
ˆ n m−
=
γ = ∇∑ X  (Gini coefficient in direction Xj) (4.4) 
   ( )n1 3 jj i
i 1
bˆ n m−
=
= ∇∑ X  (Bonferroni coefficient in direction Xj) 
When there is only one covariate X, estimation is more straightforward. In the case of ( )uΛ x  we can 
apply any nonparametric regression estimator to the data ( )1 1 n nX ,V (u),...,X ,V (u)  where 
(4.5) [ ]( )i iV (u) I i un Y= ≤   
where [ ]⋅  is the greatest integer function. One simple such estimator would be 
(4.6) ( )
( )
( )
n
i h i
i 1
n
h i
i 1
V (u)K X x
ˆ u x
Y K X x
=
=
−
Λ =
−
∑
∑
  
where ( )1hK (u) h K u h−= , K(u) is a kernel on R with K(u)du 1=∫  and h>0 a tuning parameter. 
 The Gini regression index can be estimated as 
(4.7) ( ) 1 Gˆ ˆ(x) 1 2 Y (x)−Γ = − µ   
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where 
(4.8) 
( )
( )
n
i h i
i 1
G n
h i
i 1
i1 Y K X x
n 1ˆ (x)
K X x
=
=
⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠µ =
−
∑
∑
  
Here the { }iY  are in increasing order and Xi is the covariate value the case with ordered response Yi. 
Similarly, the Bonferroni regression index can be estimated as 
(4.9) ( ) 1 Bˆ ˆ(x) 1 Y (x)−Β = + µ   
where 
(4.10) 
( )
( )
i L i
B
L i
ilog Y K X x
n 1ˆ (x)
K X x
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠µ =
−
∑
∑   
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